President Eisenhower and the NATO Essay Example for Free

President Eisenhower and the NATO EssayStephen Ambrose, in his book Eisenhower The President (pp. 215 216) gives a picture of the president as the driving force female genital organ the NATO solvent embodied in the Paris accords of late 1954. Is he right or wrong? The abrupt end of the World War II following the outpouring of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki using atomic bombs heralded a period of heightened tension between the Western World equal by the US and the Eastern World represented by Soviet sodality. Each of the two sides formed a myriad of bail bonds in bid to assert themselves across the face of the world. NATO was one such eitheriance that was purposely formed by the Capitalists (US and allies) to contain Communists (Soviet and allies). Though initially the alliance was more of a political organization than a legions one, subsequent happenings in Europe, particularly the Korean War electrified the member states into forming a strong soldiery alliance, with an int egrated army structure built under the direction of two US military commanders, one of them Eisenhower.The militarization of the alliance was necessary especially having in mind that the opposing blocs (communists) were in the process of building their own strong military arsenals and therefore there was need for a balance of power between the two blocs. Again, this was a period marked by costly defense spending, extensive customary and thermonuclear arms race, and a number of proxy wars. Rosenberg, 1979 In his book, Ambrose seeks to differ with Eisenhowers friends as well as critics who regarded him as largely offhanded for the presidency.He depicts Eisenhower as one person who carried the best credentials among persons to ever been elected to the Presidency, particularly in matters concerning foreign affairs. Ambrose has got all the reasons to throw his weight behind Eisenhowers foreign relations capabilities, given the success that he (Eisenhower) achieved when he served at various military ranks in international duty during the World Wars and the dusty War, the most notable one being his appointment as the first commander of the northwestern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).Ambrose, 1984 Until his election as the thirty-fourth US President, Eisenhower was serving as the supreme commander of the NATO forces in Europe. Moreover, in his inaugural speech he vowed to use his experience to end the Korean War. existence an experienced soldier and therefore understanding the painful impact of the modern weapons than any other person, he resolved to appeal for peace. To achieve this he advocated for high gear take of cooperation among the nations even among those who disagreed.He rejected the notion of an isolated America from the rest of the world, save behind its nuclear shield. He harbored the argument that active corporation of the US in the world affairs was the most appropriate method of making sure that democracy was achieved in nations that we re susceptible to the encroachment of Communism. He to a fault harbored the belief that sustained dialogue between the US and the Soviet would be the best option for the provision of credentials to the entire world.To achieve this, he advocated for military and economic unification of the nations that formed the Western alliance, since according to him that was the only avenue for providing the much needed peace and freedom in the Western Europe. For example, he pursue the reinforcement of NATOs southern flank by helping Italian-Yugoslavian struggle over Trieste and proposed at the Geneva summit meeting a shared celestial inspection, a move that was aimed at preventing a surprise nuclear attack.He also proposed for a project known as atoms for peace program, that sought to admit loans to American uranium to have not nations for peaceful purposes. Boll, 1988 In what seems to a support for the argument that Eisenhower understood the painful repercussions of war, Campbell Craig cla ims that Eisenhower used the policy of nuclear weapons intimidation to scare his advisors to shy from pushing him to declare war against the communists, and also to deter the communists themselves into going into war with the West, represented by the US.In his book Destroying the Village Eisenhower and nuclear War Campbell Craig argues that Eisenhowers policy of defending the United States international interests was through general thermonuclear war. Craig, 1998 p. xi He reasons that between 1956 and 1957 Eisenhower rearranged the official American basic security policy in a way that, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, the war would automatically escalate into general thermonuclear war. p. 67.The very threat of a thermonuclear war would serve as a deterrence of such a war on a national level since the US policy makers will definitely resist escalation in a crisis. Craig puts it this way, Eisenhowers strategy to evade nuclear war was to make American military policy so dangerous that his advisors would find it impossible to push Eisenhower towards war and away from compromise. p. 69. This also served as deterrence to the Soviet Union as the setting of going into a war that would escalate into thermonuclear war was so scarring.A fair analysis on Craigs work is that, it is short of neither supporting the use of rigid defense of nuclear weapons nor rejecting their strategic use. Consequently, Craig does not seem to support or refute the claim that Eisenhower was directly behind the NATO resultant role to the encroachment of the Soviet Union and its allies. He lets his audience to make a conclusion however, his arguments seem to lean more on the notion that Eisenhower used nuclear weapon diplomacy and the strengthening of the NATO and unification of the states that formed the treaty.He argues that American avoidance of nuclear war did not just happen. Actual people, above all Eisenhower, sought to evade nuclear war many powerful figures at the ce nter of decision believed that such a war was justifiable and regularly called for stairs that would have begun one. P. xii Soman argues that, during the period of crisis, between the years 954-1955, the Eisenhowers administration was mainly concerned on the fate of the treaty for the Western European Union and the admission of Germany to NATO, which was to be ratified by the European nations.Particularly, the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles was filled with the fear that any event leading to a war with China that would involve nuclear weapons would move the European opinion away from the United States and therefore leading doubts on the ratification of the treaty. Soman argues that Eisenhowers success just like many other US Presidents of post-World War II era in maintaining the United States national security and the strengthening of the NATO in the face of military threats from the Soviets was through the use of nuclear weapon diplomacy.For instance, he explains how America n atomic capabilities contributed to the working out of a truce in the North Korean war. He reasons that, Eisenhower had no option in the use of nuclear diplomacy to counter the encroachment of the Soviet Union and its allies he had patrimonial a stalemated war in the Korea, a costly military build up, and armed forces that despite nearly three years of massive conventional rearmament still left the United States heavily dependent on atomic arsenal. Soman, 2000 p. 36 He therefore chose to reject any Soviet proposal to ban nuclear weapons knowing very well that this was his only trump card.